Wiles Legal Definition

Similarly, she would be considered a “dermatologist” if she spent “a significant portion of her time” treating skin conditions. In my opinion, “psychiatrist,” “cardiologist,” and “dermatologist” are artificial terms that denote that a licensed physician not only “spends a significant portion of his or her time diagnosing and treating” certain conditions, but is also a “specialist” in diagnosing and treating certain conditions. The term “specialist” is defined as “a practitioner who is dedicated to a particular class of diseases.” Dorland`s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (24th edition 1965). “Psychiatry” is the branch of medicine that “deals with the science and practice of treating psychological, emotional or behavioral disorders, especially those causing endogenous causes or as a result of defective interpersonal relationships.” Webster`s Third International Dictionary (1969). Thus, a “psychiatrist” is “a doctor specializing in psychiatry. Webster`s Third New International Dictionary (1969). No other state with psychiatrist-patient privilege has limited the term “psychiatrist” to physicians specially trained to practice psychiatry, as suggested by Dissent and as the Court of Appeal *597 concluded in Barnes. See 8 J. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence, § 2380, no.

5 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) (Supp. 1994). The problem with this definition is that it places undue emphasis on training physicians while ignoring their time spent in practice. States have generally defined a psychiatrist as a licensed physician who spends a significant portion of his or her time practicing psychiatry or engaging in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition. [4] Ronald L. Wiles (“Defendant”) was charged with the Class D crime of driving under the influence of alcohol contrary to section 577.010.1, RSMo 1994. A jury found the accused guilty and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing his request for acquittal and convicting him under section 577.010.1 of the RSMo 1994 because the state could not prove beyond a doubt that he had “driven” his vehicle under the influence of alcohol, and (2) denied his request for termination and presented a direction to the jury, the term “exploited” as “driving or physically driving” and refused to give its definition of “exploited”. In arguing that I apply the same approach in this case, Wiles overlooks an essential difference between the wording of Article 2252A and the legal wording at issue in Saavedra-Valazquez. Saavedra-Valazquez spoke of a previous conviction for a “violent crime,” which by definition includes “the offenses of aiding and abetting the commission of such offenses, conspiracy and attempting to commit such offenses.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2 cmt. 5. Paragraph 2252(Ab), on the other hand, does not refer to “attempt”. Given that the categorical approach requires a court to “compare the elements of the state offense with the predicate offense defined in federal law,” there is no reason to compare Montana`s trial law to the federal trial law — trial is not part of the definition of predicate offenses. See Strickland, 601 F.3d to 967 (cited Sinerius, 504 F.3d to 740) (emphasis added). Similarly, the term “exploitation” as used in the current version of sections 577.010.1, Sr.A. 1994 and 577.001.1, RSMo.Supp.1998, has a clear and ordinary meaning that can be recognized by a person of ordinary intelligence. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to further define the term “exploit” beyond the definition in section 577.001.1, RSMo.Supp.1998. See United States v. Shyres, 898 F.2d 647, 654 (8 th Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 821, 111 p.

C. 69, 112 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1990) (“Response to a request for further jury instructions is at the discretion of the [trial court]”); United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 720 (8. Cir.1980) (the trial court is “not bound to define words in the ordinary interpretation of the jury”). To establish that Rebilas` conviction was categorically a conviction for attempted sexual abuse of a minor under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) and (U), we would have to conclude not only that the definition of public sexual indecency against a minor under ARS § 13-1403(B) was categorical of sexual abuse of a minor, but also that Arizona`s definition of attempt under ARS Section 13-1001 was categorical. That was consistent with the federal definition of experience. This would require a second Taylor analysis comparing the elements of the experiment under Arizona law with the elements of the experiment under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(U). While Missouri courts have used the terms “exploitation” and “conduct” interchangeably, resulting in some confusion, this in itself does not mean that the two terms have become synonymous. According to the traditional rules of legal construction, “every word, every clause, every sentence and every article of a law should have meaning.” Missouri Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass`n v. Pott Indus., 971 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Mo. bench 1998). However, the defendant`s interpretation of the term “establishment” would have the effect of removing this word from the definition in section 577.001.1, R.S.Supp.1998, since the term would be used entirely by the word “conduct”. “An accused convicted of violating Section 2252A is liable to a more severe penalty if he has already been convicted by the state `for aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse or abusive sexual conduct against a minor.`” Id., p. 967 (cited § 2252A (b)(1), (2)). “We have interpreted this law broadly as applying not only to state crimes that constitute sexual abuse, but to `any state offense that is in any way related, relates to or is connected with that generic offense` (cited by Sinerius, 504 F.3d to 743).

In determining whether a previous conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under section 2252A (b), “we rely on the well-known two-step test set out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).” Sinerius, 504 F.3d to 740; Strickland, 601 F.3d to 967. First, we look at the definition of the predicate offence in federal law. Sinerius, 504 F.3d to 740. In this case, the expanded range of penalties provided for in section 2252A applies to a person who has been convicted “under the laws of any State relating to serious sexual abuse, sexual abuse or sexual abuse with a minor or ward.” Section 2252A (b)(1). Thus, “the relevant offences referred to in section 2252A (b) are those relating to serious sexual abuse, sexual abuse or sexual misconduct with a minor or ward”. “Sinerius, 504 F.3d to 740 (citation omitted).